チュウゴク ニオケル コクレン PKO サンカ ノ レキシ オヨビ コンゴ ノ センザイセイ ニツイテ by 石塚 勝美 & Katsumi Ishizuka
―　37　―
Abstract：
　　UN peacekeeping operations have played a significant role as a conflict resolution in the post-
WWⅡ period. In terms of China, it is a relatively new contributor to UN peacekeeping. China, 
which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was rather passive with regard to middle 
powers-led UN operations during the Cold War period. It also adhered to the traditional norms of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention. However, since the end of the Cold War, China has re-
viewed its peacekeeping policy and has had stronger commitments to UN operations. For example, 
China indicated its enthusiasm towards UN peacekeeping in their participation in Cambodia (UN-
TAC) and East Timor (UNTAET). At present, China’s current record of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions is remarkable. China actively sends its personnel to UN peacekeeping mainly to Africa includ-
ing in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), and the Sudan (UNMIS). It 
stems from the states’ flexible peacekeeping policy. This policy is due to a good balance between 
political realism and liberalism, or domestic and international perspectives in its participation in 
peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, it is recommended that China should pay more attention to 
security, especially in Asia by peacekeeping. For example, China should take the initiative and es-
tablish a regional peace-building mechanism.
Keywords: China, peacekeeping operations, state policy, state sovereignty, non-intervention
概要：
　国連平和維持活動（PKO）は、第二次世界大戦以降の国際紛争解決において重要な役
割を果たしてきた。中国の PKOへの参加は、その設立創成期から始まったとは言えない。
中国は国連安全保障理事会の常任理事国であるために、東西冷戦期においてミドルパワー
主体であった PKOには必然的に消極的であった。中国は、また伝統的に国家主権や内政
不干渉の政策を採っていたのもその一因である。しかし東西冷戦終了後、中国は、それま
での PKO政策を見直し、PKOに積極的な姿勢を打ち出している。その結果中国はカン
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ボジアや東ティモールにおける PKOに参加を果たし、現在の中国は世界有数の PKO派
遣大国となり、主にアフリカ諸国への派遣が目覚しい。そのような中国の PKO参加への
柔軟的な姿勢は、政治的な現実主義や理想主義、あるいは国際的あるいは国内的な視野の
バランスの取れた政策によることができよう。そして昨今の PKO派遣における様々な統
計を考慮した場合、中国はアジアを中心とした国際安全保障体制に更なる注目を寄せるべ
きである。たとえば中国は、アジア地域の平和構築体系の設立において中心的な役割を果
たすことが期待される。
キーワード：中国、国連平和維持活動、国家政策、国家主権、内政不干渉
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1. Introduction:
　　This paper examines UN peacekeeping policy from the dispatching side, and focuses on Chi-
na. UN peacekeeping operations, which were initiated as a replacement for the totally ineffective 
post-WWII collective security environment, have played a vital role in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. The continuing significance of UN peacekeeping operations for conflict 
resolutions can be recognised by the fact that there are currently more than 90,000 military and ci-
vilian police forces serving in 17 operations around the world.1 Currently, China adopts a “UN-cen-
tred policy”, and therefore aspires to be a positive contributor to peacekeeping operations. However, 
the state used to be passive or on occasion inactive towards UN peacekeeping during the Cold War 
period, mainly due to its own domestic factors that influenced troop mobilization for peacekeeping. 
In fact, it was not until the 1990s that China started dispatching its troops to UN peacekeeping op-
erations after solving its own domestic restraints. This paper recommends China’s further commit-
ment to UN peacekeeping, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This paper begins by introducing 
the two key foreign policy approaches, and several positive factors that encourages the states to 
participate in UN peacekeeping. This paper then applies them to the case of China.
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2. UN Peacekeeping as a Foreign Policy
　　Naturally, participation in peacekeeping operations is considered to be an important compo-
nent of foreign policy for contributing states. Furthermore, when one considers the theory of peace-
keeping from the viewpoint of the contributing side, the following two points should be considered. 
First, UN peacekeeping operations can provide each member state with an opportunity to contribute 
in their own way. That is to say, all of the UN member states have an equal chance to participate in 
peacekeeping as far as they have the will and capability to do so. In fact, according to statistics 
from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN, there is a nearly equal distri-
bution of contribution to peacekeeping by each power.2
　　Secondly, and more importantly, the UN is a non-persuasive in nature when deciding which 
states contribute. As Alan James notes, “it is a great mistake to conceive of the UN as the prime 
mover …It is very far from the case that the world organisation simply speaks, and the relevant 
states then hasten to comply with its wishes, in the manner of ciphers.” 3 It is normally state con-
tributors rather than the UN which show a keen interest in participating in peacekeeping missions. 
It is true that contributing states are usually finalised at the UN Security Council, followed by the 
host states' approval of the candidate states' service as peacekeepers, and that an official invitation 
is always made from the UN. However, a formal invitation is always based on the understanding of 
some informal discussion that has already taken place between UN officials and delegates from the 
member states that are keen to participate. Therefore, the policy of peacekeeping operations adopted 
by the dispatching side depends on the discretion of the governments of the contributing states. In 
sum, a strong motivation to commit to peacekeeping operations will enable any state to become a 
positive contributor.
　　How are states motivated to participate in peacekeeping? In answering this basic question, one 
can apply a basic theory of international relations, that is, the classical debate between idealists, 
who advocate a collective approach to international conflict, and realists who favour the self-help 
approach.
　　In terms of the idealist perspective, it is generally agreed that state policy is essentially “good 
and altruistic”, and therefore states are “capable of mutual aid and collaboration though reason and 
ethically inspired education.” 4 Peacekeeping operations, which sometimes lead to enormous casu-
alties, must also have a sense of “altruism.” Likewise, a peacekeeping operation is an activity of in-
ternational “aid and collaboration”, providing civilian and military personnel to conflicting areas. 
Idealists believe that universal moral principles can guide policy, and therefore international organi-
sations such as the UN will address the major problems facing the world today. In reality, the ma-
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jority of international peacekeeping operations have been authorised and operated by the UN. 
Therefore, according to basic theory, UN peacekeeping operations have to be based on an idealistic 
approach. Idealists expect international peacekeeping operations to be an appropriate instrument for 
the improvement of long-term global peace and security rather than short-term stability.
　　Andreas Anderson argues that in regard to state participation in peacekeeping operations, there 
is a viable alternative to explanations based on Realpolitik. He emphasises that the purpose of 
peacekeeping is not only to end conflict but also to prevent its recurrence by promoting democracy. 
He mentions that among the substantial contributors to peace support operations, well-consolidated 
democracies show the greatest propensity to participate. He also notes that among the states in con-
flict, non-democratic states undertake a disproportionate number of operations.5
　　According to the idealist perspective, states which participate in peacekeeping operations in a 
positive manner should be regarded as “internationalist” rather than “nationalist.” Their peacekeep-
ing policies are the result of governments’ overall foreign policy direction. In other words, as David 
Wainhouse claims, “Participation in a peacekeeping operation is a voluntary act and if a state has 
no special interest in a situation it will usually have a fairly high degree of general interest.” 6  A 
similar premise is posited by Boutros Boutros-Ghali: “all states … have a strong interest in prevent-
ing a global pattern of violence, in checking the disease of conflict, and in deterring would-be ag-
gressors.” 7
　　Meanwhile, the school of political realism is influenced by the notion of the “national inter-
ests.” National interest is considered to be an analytical tool used to identify foreign policy objec-
tives. In other words, once a government identifies national interests, it establishes objectives, 
which then direct state policies. Therefore, a state consistently adhering to its national interests is 
likely to maintain its political balance and continue to progress towards its goal.8 Contributions to 
peacekeeping operations can also be supported by this realist theory. Alan James argues that in 
peacekeeping operations the question of which states should be invited to contribute to an opera-
tion, or whose offers should be accepted, is often intensely political. He is clear that in relation to 
any decision to establish peacekeeping operations, political factors are both most visible and most 
important, and that without such authorisations, peacekeeping operations would not exist at all.9
　　David Bobrow and Mark Boyer consider peacekeeping operations as “impure public goods” 
that have continued to be provided by the self-interests of contributing states associated with main-
taining some modicum of international system stability. In addition, they insist that UN peacekeep-
ing operations are “club goods”; where by some highly supportive participants remain members of 
UN PKO club for reasons pertaining to their status within the UN.10 These goods are, therefore, not 
universally motivated.
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　　Laura Neack also strongly supports the realist account regarding a state’s participation in 
peacekeeping operations. She focuses on the fact that peacekeeping forces seem heavily dominated 
by one group of states, the so-called “middle powers”, that are willing to put considerable strength 
behind their participation. Her main argument is that the particular interests that have been served 
by UN peacekeeping are those of western states, who benefit from the status quo, and of a few non-
western states that lay claim to some prestige in international affairs through their UN activities. In-
terestingly, she points out that such middle power states are among the top 13 major weapons’ ex-
porters to the developing world, which has frequently requested and accepted international 
peacekeeping operations at the same time.  She sees arms sales and peacekeeping as tied to the 
same mission: the pursuit of national interests.
　　Furthermore, the term “national interests” was explicitly mentioned by the US in the context 
of peacekeeping operations. On 4 May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was 
signed by then US President Bill Clinton. PDD-25 thoroughly pursued national interests, ensuring 
that US peacekeeping policy becomes more selective and cost-effective.11
　　Thus, one can identify both liberalist and realist influences on peacekeeping policy by contrib-
uting states. Each contributing state has adopted both perspectives, and whether its peacekeeping 
policy focuses more on liberalism or realism depends on the state in question.
　　Apart from discussion on the theory of international relations, there are several considerations 
which motivate states to participate in peacekeeping operations. States consider the participation of 
peacekeeping from international perspectives. As general foreign policies, for example, great pow-
ers tend to express their concern for international stability and decide to send troops to peacekeep-
ing operations as “world policemen”. Middle powers have also adopted a high profile on peace-
keeping as an instrument of their central foreign policy. It is because middle powers, which have no 
colonial experience and adequate military equipment, consider that peacekeeping provides them 
with the best opportunity to show originality in their diplomacy. Neutral powers also believe that 
they can contribute usefully and effectively to international peace and security by their commitment 
to UN peacekeeping operations.
　　States are also motivated to show their commitment to UN peacekeeping by domestic consid-
erations. For example, participation in peacekeeping operations is attractive because it can bring 
significant financial profits, especially for several developing states in that they may desire to profit 
from the reimbursement of the costs of troop contributions. Presumably, the massive scale of partic-
ipation of UN peacekeeping from South Asian states such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and India is at-
tributed to this category.12 Likewise, activation of a nation’s military by joining peacekeeping opera-
tions is also a significant factor in terms of motivation. Such states may be attracted to 
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peacekeeping, because they can enlarge their military by increasing the number of personnel, and 
making improvement to military equipment and facilities at the expense of the UN. UN peacekeep-
ing will also provide troops with an ideal practical environment for their training.
　　Thus, it can be pointed out that participating in peacekeeping should be positively assessed by 
each state. Each contributing state embraces the characteristics of internationalism (international 
ambition and responsibility) and/or nationalism (domestic concern) in terms of participation in 
peacekeeping. The difference in peacekeeping policy among each power is the difference of the 
balance between their concern for international stability or for domestic interests. There is a tenden-
cy for bigger states to value their commitment to peacekeeping with respect to international stabili-
ty, and for the smaller states to prioritize domestic interests. This is because international stability, 
although it is indirect, is a significant responsibility as a world policeman or for the promotion of 
world trade for great powers. Peacekeeping policy for great powers is just one of many foreign poli-
cies, and the effects which the great powers expect by participating in peacekeeping are more diver-
sified. Meanwhile smaller states’ peacekeeping policy is more significant than the great powers be-
cause they expect more tangible and direct effects from peacekeeping.13 The next section explores 
the nature of peacekeeping policy in China.
3. Chinese Peacekeeping Policy Based on Domestic and International Perspectives
　　China’s commitment to UN peacekeeping operations was relatively late. One of the basic rea-
sons is that UN peacekeeping was essentially a Western activity during the Cold War period. In-
deed, there were even direct clashes between the UN and Chinese forces during the Korean War in 
the 1950s. Several observers attribute the hostility of the Soviet Union to the UN peacekeeping op-
erations in the Sinai (UNEF I) and the Congo (ONUC) to the fact that no socialist countries were 
included in their make-up.14 When the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) was creat-
ed in 1965, then UN Secretary General U Thant invited Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and 
Poland to provide military personnel to help supervise the cease-fire, but all the Eastern Europeans 
declined to participate.15 In those days, China declined to burden the annual budget with UN peace-
keeping. China considered that UN peacekeeping operations simply protected the interests of the 
Western powers.
　　Even after the membership of the People’s Republic of China in the UN became official in 
1971, China was inactive in peacekeeping. China, as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, continued abstaining from Security Council voting on UN peacekeeping. Another main 
reason for China’s inaction in peacekeeping was the state’s strong advocacy of Westphalian norms 
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of state sovereignty and non-intervention. China’s support of state sovereignty and non-intervention 
was partly motivated by the fact that China was the sole representative of developing countries in 
the UN Security Council, supporting the completion of the decolonization process in the Third 
World. China also condemned the Soviet Union for violating the state sovereignty of Czechoslova-
kia in the UN General Assembly in 1974. Furthermore, China considered that UN peacekeeping 
could be used to interfere in its own domestic disputes including the Taiwan Question.16
　　Since Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978 and advocated a more market-oriented economy, 
China’s foreign policy has been gradually shifting. China advocated its historical “independent for-
eign policy of peace”, which reviewed its traditional foreign policy and promoted peaceful relations 
with the West and the rest of the world. This new foreign policy was initially adopted during the 
12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Xia Liping, a China analyst, assessed the 
“independent foreign policy of peace” as follows:
　　“Peace” means that China began to formulate its foreign policy from the viewpoint of 
whether it is beneficial to international and regional peace, instead of the viewpoint of 
pursuing military superiority, while “independence” means that China began to formulate 
its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of 
all the countries in the world. 17
　　The “independent foreign policy of peace” encouraged the Chinese Government to review its 
peacekeeping policy, too. China’s significant shift to pro-UN peacekeeping stance was recognized 
by its vote in favour of Security Council Resolution 495 authorizing the extension of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1981. China started paying UN peacekeep-
ing dues a year later.18 It sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to study the peacekeeping 
operations there.
　　What encouraged China to move to a more pro-peacekeeping policy? Of course, the state’s 
shift of foreign policy to a more market-oriented economy is one of the main factors. China started 
valuing the Bretton Woods system during this period: China joined the IMF and the World Bank in 
1980. As Yin He puts it, “After re-evaluating the UN regime, the Chinese leadership began to un-
derstand that this international organization could serve as an ideal platform to broaden its global 
horizon and create a favourable international environment for its prioritized economic development 
reform policy.” 19 As mentioned before, China was in a unique position in that it behaved as a de-
veloping country on one hand, and having a strong voice in the decision that the UN Security 
Council was addressing on the other. Now China could adopt an equidistant policy with regard to 
the US and the Soviet Union. Therefore, China, which was the great political power and a champi-
on of developing countries, considered it best to to become ostracized by the international commu-
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nity because of UN peacekeeping operations.
　　There was a significant increase in demand for UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. 
The very late 1980s and the early 1990s witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise 
of the bi-polar system in international politics. As a result, the former communist countries in the 
Central and Eastern Europe wanted to become involved in the Western military and political sys-
tem. An overflow of internal ethnic and religious conflict, which occasionally involved the brutal 
genocide of innocent civilians led to the collapse of states and changed the scope of conflict resolu-
tion by the international system. These events prompted several significant adaptations to UN 
peacekeeping operations in the quantitative and qualitative spheres. The number of UN peacekeep-
ing operations deployed significantly increased from only 11 in January 1988 to 28 in December 
1994.20 The unanimity among the Security Council’s permanent members, including China, facili-
tated successful peacekeeping operations in former Cold-War-related spots such as Afghanistan, 
Iran-Iraq, Namibia, Angola, and Nicaragua.21
　　In terms of a qualitative change in peacekeeping, the vast majority of its operations in the post-
Cold War period became ones for internal conflicts, which were called “second-generation peace-
keeping.” They were multi-functional to support the implementation of a comprehensive settlement 
including the missions of conducing elections, human rights verification, supervising existing ad-
ministrations etc.22 This kind of peacekeeping was seen in most new operations in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s, such as in Angola (UNAVEM), Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL), West-
ern Sahara (MINURSO), the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Cambodia (UNTAC), Somalia 
(UNOSOM) etc. A significant achievement of UN peacekeeping operations for international con-
flict resolution was the fact that the UN operations themselves won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.
　　Thus, the remarkable progress of UN peacekeeping operations reflected the China’s foreign 
policy on conflict resolutions. In November 1988, China became a member of General Assembly’s 
Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. Then in the following year, China sent twenty ci-
vilian officials to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist with a general 
election in Namibia. In 1990, China finally dispatched military personnel to the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was the state’s first official participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations. In 1992 and 1993, China participated in the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC), sending 800 PLA engineering units. In 1997, China joined 
United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS).23
　　With the increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations, it was essential that the UN per-
suaded more states to join UN peacekeeping. According to statistics from the Blue Helmet 1996 
(UN edition), in total 112 states out of the whole 181 member states of the UN participated in at 
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least one UN peacekeeping operation or more. According to one criterion by the number of UN op-
erations which states participated24, 25 states became categorised as “positive contributing states”. 
By dividing them into three classes; great powers (the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council), the Western states, and the Third World states, the 25 positive states can be profiled as can 
in Table 1.:
Table 1. The so-called “positive contributing states” to UN peacekeeping in 1996
The great powers
(2 states)
France (17 operations), Russia (16)
The Western states
(12 states)
Australia (16 operations), Austria (20), Belgium (15), Canada (33), Denmark (19), Finland (19),
Ireland (26), Netherland (20), New Zealand (18), Norway (25), Poland (20), Sweden (26)
The Third World states
(11 states)
Argentina (22 operations), Bangladesh (22), Brazil (16), Egypt (17), Ghana (20), India (21),
Indonesia (19), Jordan (26), Malaysia (19), Nigeria (19), Pakistan (21)
Sources: The Blue Helmets: the Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, the UN, 1996
　　This classification can indicate that each power category equally had some significant contrib-
utors in 1996. Therefore, it can be concluded that there was no longer an ideological factor in the 
preference for participation in UN peacekeeping in the 1990s. In other words, during this period 
UN peacekeeping operations became broadly accepted as an effective tool for conflict resolution. 
China was not an exception. According to the Blue Helmet 1996,  China had already dispatched 
eight UN peacekeeping operations in the international field although its contribution was the least 
significant among the permanent members of the Security Council.25 Most of the Chinese missions 
in UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s were military observers in such places as Western Sa-
hara (MINURSO), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Liberia (UNOMIL) and Iran-Kuwait (UNIKOM).
　　However, there was a dilemma in China’s peacekeeping policy during the 1990s. Most of the 
UN peacekeeping during this period were internal missions which required rebuilding collapsed 
states after totally devastating religious or ethnic conflicts. And it was an international organization, 
namely, the UN, which played the main role in state-building or peace-building. However, China’s 
positive involvement in state-building missions was not compatible with its basic foreign policy of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention. Therefore, China’s provision of 800-strong PLA engineer-
ing units to UNTAET was not repeated. Pang Zhongying, in his article “China’s Changing Attitude 
to UN Peacekeeping”, also pointed out this issue as follows:
　　This was partly due to China’s rigid attitude towards the principles of state sovereign-
ty and its concern about the use of force in peacekeeping operations. These issues only 
served to highlight the emerging contradictions and ambiguities with regard to China’s 
position on the nature of peace operations.26 
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　　Zongying maintained that China’s 2000 Defence White Paper provided a good summary of 
China’s principles for conducting UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. The White Paper 
adhered to the aims and principles of the UN Charter and insisted on the settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means, such as mediation, good offices and negotiation. It did not support the use of mili-
tary means for achieving humanitarian ends.27 Therefore, China expressed reluctance to dispatch its 
forces to the so-called peace enforcement operations based on Chapter VII of UN Charter, such as 
ones in Somalia (UNOSOMII) or former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).
　　The current trend of UN peacekeeping has not been compatible with the Chinese conservative 
policy for peacekeeping. For example, in August 2000, the Report of the Panel on the United Na-
tions Peace Operations, or the “Brahimi Report” as it is often called, recommended that the rules of 
engagement in peacekeeping should be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the 
initiative to their attackers.28 It meant that the use of force was expected to be applied more fre-
quently in UN peacekeeping. The concept of human security as well as state security has been 
strongly advocated especially since the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. It was under-
standable that the implementation of human security would require more external involvement into 
domestic affairs from the international community.
　　The concept of human security developed into another concept called “Responsibility to Pro-
tect (R2P)”, which provided a legal and ethical basis for “humanitarian intervention”. The principle 
of R2P was formed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
in December 2001, and officially endorsed in the World Summit in September 2005. As the 2005 
World Summit outcome document puts it:
　　The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance 
with Chapter Ⅶ  and Ⅷ  of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner …29 
　　China endorsed the 2005 World Summit outcome document. The Chinese Government consid-
ered that the norm of non-interference would not provide cover for genocide and mass atrocity 
crimes, and force can be a necessary last resort to protect besieged populations. However, China’s 
endorsement of R2P does not signify a radical shift in its non-interference policy, nor does it over-
ride its rhetorical commitment to sovereignty. China also maintains that protecting civilians is not 
the sole remit of the Security Council but requires integrated strategies across various UN bodies 
and regional organizations. Furthermore, China’s endorsement of R2P is not tantamount to a full 
endorsement of humanitarian intervention; the Chinese Government has adamantly been averse to 
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non-consensual military intervention, even when state leaders are themselves the perpetrators of 
mass atrocities.30 It can be recognised by the fact that in such cases as Zimbabwe and Myanmar, 
China has resisted calls from human rights advocacy groups and some Western governments to pur-
sue intervention based on humanitarian justification.31 Therefore, Beijing’s engagement of R2P is 
more nuanced than its declaratory statements.
　　Nevertheless, China’s current record on participation in UN peacekeeping is remarkable. In 
August 2007, General Zhao Jingmin was appointed as the force commander of the UN Mission for 
the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the first Chinese national to have held such a po-
sition.32 At the time of writing, China contributes a total of 2,153 peacekeepers to 10 UN operations. 
The number of Chinese personnel in UN peacekeeping is ranked 13th among all of the contributing 
states, and is now top among the five permanent members of the Security Council (Table. 2). China 
has sent its personnel to all four continents where there are UN missions. This is a significant de-
parture from China’s early policy towards UN peacekeeping.33 
Table 2. Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations (Top 50: June 2009)
Rank Country Number Rank Country Number
1 Pakistan 10,603 26 Argentina 857
2 Bangladesh 9,982 27 Togo 821
3 India 8,607 28 Zambia 723
4 Nigeria 5,960 29 Philippines 592
5 Nepal 4,148 30 Niger 579
6 Rwanda 3,584 31 Turkey 564
7 Jordan 3,231 32 Chile 543
8 Ghana 3,159 33 Austria 522
9 Egypt 2,956 34 Tunisia 504
10 Italy 2,690 35 Ireland 465
11 Uruguay 2,533 36 Bolivia 441
12 Ethiopia 2,394 37 Republic of Korea 390
13 China 2,153 38 Gambia 377
14 Senegal 2,127 39 Ukraine 375
15 South Africa 1,983 40 Portugal 345
16 France 1,879 41 Russia 328
17 Indonesia 1,617 42 Guatemala 288
18 Morocco 1,561 43 United Kingdom 283
19 Benin 1,349 44 Germany 282
20 Brazil 1,346 45 Fiji 268
21 Poland 1,149 46 Monglia 258
22 Spain 1,094 47 Belgium 246
23 Sri Lanka 1,040 48 Peru 233
24 Malaysia 913 49 Yemen 226
25 Kenya 881 50 Slovakia 212
Sources: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO), the United Nations 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributor/index.shtml
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　　In particular, China’s commitment to participation in peacekeeping in African states is signifi-
cant. As many as 1,634 personnel are deployed in 6 states in Africa, including Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sudan (UNAMID and UNMIS), Liberia 
(UNOMIL) and Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI). In other words, three out of four Chinese peacekeepers are 
concentrated in Africa.
　　It is considered that there are some reasons for China’s enthusiasm for African missions. Xulio 
Rios raises three reasons. The first is the promotion of cooperation with the African Union for eco-
nomic integration and social development. The second one is the development of forms of military 
cooperation in the region. The third one is to give a good impression of China’s influence on the 
African continent which is rich in national resources and raw material.34 Yin He has a different and 
more positive view. He argues that China’s active participation in peacekeeping in Africa is partly 
attributed to its comprehensive policy towards this war-torn and poverty-stricken continent. He also 
claims that another reason is due to the comparative indifference of the West with regards to peace-
keeping operations in Africa.35
　　What motivates China to contribute to UN peacekeeping at the present time? As mentioned 
before, a market-oriented economy would still be one of the reasons. Peacekeeping might be a low 
cost way of demonstrating commitment to the UN and to international peace and security for 
China.36 Peacekeeping contributes to modernising the practice of Chinese armed forces through 
communication with troops from other countries.
　　However, China’s motivation with regard to UN peacekeeping should also be based on more 
international perspectives. China’s strong commitment to UN peacekeeping might be attributed to 
its strong desire to strengthen the capacity of the UN, resulting in pressure on recent US unilateral 
policies. China’s participation in UN missions has also been welcomed since many Western states 
preferred non-UN missions such as ones led by NATO and the EU. Political liberalism was also 
identified in China’s willingness to participate in UN peacekeeping. In an interview, Major General 
Zhang, the Deputy Chief of General Staff for PLA, answered “… In addressing grave issues involv-
ing international peace and security, we are a responsible country. … Chinese peacekeeping activi-
ties demonstrate our country’s image as a responsible superpower.” 37 Such international perspec-
tives of China have responded to the climate change of the international political stage and conflict 
resolutions especially since the 1990s. Such flexible policies have been required to great powers 
like China by the international community. On the whole, Chinese peacekeeping policy has both 
domestic and international perspectives, and both the approaches of political realism and liberalism.
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4. Necessity of Further Commitments of China to UN Peacekeeping Operations: 
　　As stated before, there has been increasing demand for international peacekeeping especially 
since the end of the Cold War. This demand has been encouraged by the emerging theories and ad-
vocacies such as Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 199238 and the Brahimi Report in 2000. 
The increasing demand of peacekeeping has also been promoted by emerging concepts such as hu-
manitarian intervention and “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)”. While a number of peacekeeping op-
erations have been deployed to meet the demand, they have faced various challenges.
　　For example, 2006 was the most challenging year for UN peacekeeping operations since the 
1990s. The crises in South Lebanon and Timor-Leste in 2006, for example, offered an opportunity 
to reconsider the effectiveness of UN operations, namely, UNIFIL and UNOTIL. As a result, the 
size of UNIFIL expanded, and UNOTIL was replaced by a more robust operation, named, UNMIT. 
However, the strengthening of UN peacekeeping led to another problem: the overstretch of global-
ly-extended peace operations despite their limited capacity. The Annual Review of Global Peace 
Operations argued:
　　UN operations were under “acute and worsening strain” , and its editors warned that 
one more large mission might take the organization “past the point of overstretch” . As the 
year [of 2006] progressed, similar warning proliferated: in October, the UN’s Under-Sec-
retary-General for Peacekeeping Operations gave a press conference reflecting on the risk 
of overstretch arising from the “enormous” technical and administrative problems con-
fronting his department.39
　　The technical and administrative problems can be partly solved by China’s further assistance. 
The logistic units including engineering and transportation by Chinese peacekeeping forces are 
well-known for their high level of skill.
　　Another problem with current peacekeeping operations is a lack of geographical balance in 
their dispatch. According to statistics on the deployment of UN military personnel by region in Oc-
tober 2006, the African region accounted for 75.3% of total UN peacekeeping all over the world. 
(Table 3.) 40 In this sense, China should have a stronger voice in order to invite more UN missions 
to volatile areas in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Aceh or the Solomon Islands.
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Table 3. Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006
Region Troops/
Military Observers % of Total
Africa 54, 587 75.3
East Asia and the Pacific 31 0.1
Central and South Asia 54 0.1
Middle East 10,147 14
Europe 1,017 1.4
Central and South America 6,652 9.2
North America ‒ ‒
Sources: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Center on International Co-operations
　　Furthermore, it is to be noted that there is clearly “a geographical division of labour” in the or-
igin of UN military staff by region. For example, about 80% of the military staff in UN peacekeep-
ing operations in the Middle East are from European countries (Table 4.), and more than 50% of the 
military staff in UN operations in Africa are from Central and South Asian countries. (Table 5.)  It 
is easily recognised that security in the Middle East is significant for the national interests of Euro-
pean countries. However, such a lack of balance in the origin of UN military personnel will result 
in the problem of technological and operational inequality in UN operations. Therefore, the interna-
tional community should expect China’s further commitment to UN operations, as the representa-
tive of the great powers in Asia, in order to achieve better geographical balance.
Table 4. Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2006
Region Troops/
Military Observers % of Total
Africa 640 6.3
East Asia and the Pacific 468 4.6
Central and South Asia 914 9
Middle East ‒ ‒
Europe 8,104 79.9
Central and South America 8 0.1
North America 13 0.1
Sources: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Center on International Co-operations
Table 5. Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2006
Region Troops/
Military Observers % of Total
Africa 17,943 32.9
East Asia and the Pacific 2,414 4.4
Central and South Asia 28,468 52.2
Middle East 2,197 4
Europe 1,551 2.8
Central and South America 1,957 3.6
North America 57 0.1
Sources: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Center on International Co-operations
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　　Other data which encourages the more positive participation of China in UN peacekeeping is 
the increasing number of non-UN peace operations which have been established outside of Asia. 
For example, according to the datum on the global deployment of military personnel to peace oper-
ations in October in 2008, UN operations account for less than half (48%) of the entire peace opera-
tions. NATO operations are catching up with the UN, accounting for 40%. The peace operations led 
by other organizations such as the EU, the AU and ECOWAS, all of which are outside of Asia, ac-
count for 12%.41 This is a significant indicator that UN operations might be replaced by regional 
peace operations as a main actor of peacekeeping. However, it is not probable that regional organi-
zations will set up their own peacekeeping operations in Asia in the near future. This means that all 
of the conflicts or post-conflict situations in Asia will be solved and managed by UN-led operations, 
but at the same time UN peacekeeping will be able to invite fewer non-Asian personnel as peace-
keepers in the future than at present. Therefore, China will have to place higher priority on partici-
pation in UN peacekeeping.
　　On the whole, the above data is evidence that although there is increasing demand and supply 
for peacekeeping, one can identify imbalance and inequality on the dispatch side. This imbalance 
and inequality is not suitable for peacekeeping in Asia. UN peacekeeping, except for ones in the 
Middle East, have already been marginalized or will be more seriously marginalized. This encour-
ages China to play a more active role as UN peacekeepers in Asia.
　　Meanwhile, it is considered that China has considerable potential to contribute to post-conflict 
peace-building by the UN. Although peace-building missions originated as early as the 1960s, the 
demands of state-building have increased in the post-Cold War period when a number of internal 
conflicts in Asia and Africa necessitated the building of newly-democratised states. UN peace-
building requires not only security-building but also capacity-building and confidence-building. 
Post-conflict security-building emphasises human security such as refugee repatriation, DDR42, and 
the protection of human rights by peacekeeping forces. Capacity-building in UN operations should 
include a variety of elements such as good governance, law enforcement and judicial frameworks, 
democratisation, social and economic development, infrastructure, medical services and education. 
Confidence-building will also be needed by local people in the post-conflict peace process. There-
fore, it can be said that post-conflict UN peace-building is multi-functional, requiring a variety of 
non-military and civilian sectors. In this sense, peace-building is a highly suitable UN operation 
which China would be willing to commit. UN peace-building requires strong civil-military rela-
tions. Furthermore, since peace-building operations require a strong regional commitment to confi-
dence-building, a post-conflict peace process in Asia-Pacific region requires China’s commitment 
for regional peace and security. In December 2005, the Peace-building Commission was established 
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by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. This Commission, which was established on 
the recommendation of the High-level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change in 200443, is an in-
ter-governmental advisory body which helps states in peace-building. China is the member of the 
Peace-building Commission, as a permanent member of the Security Council. Therefore, China 
should take an initiative in establishing regional peace-building mechanism.
5. Conclusion:
　　Peacekeeping operations have been a significant instrument in conflict resolution for interna-
tional peace and security. Many UN member states have recognized this significance, and have ex-
pressed the will to contribute to UN peacekeeping as a duty of member states, and also as a part of 
their desire for international peace. States can also serve their national interests by dispatching per-
sonnel to UN peacekeeping from the international and domestic perspectives.
　　This paper indicated that China, which has adopted a “UN centred policy”, had domestic re-
straints on dispatching their troops to UN peacekeeping during the Cold-War period. The norms of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention prevented China from participating in all of the UN peace-
keeping missions during the Cold War period. However, China’s shift to a pro-peacekeeping policy 
has been remarkable. China’s support of the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention was 
compromised by the current trend of internal UN peacekeeping. China also recognised the signifi-
cance of applying itself to the current concepts of conflict resolution emerging from the internation-
al community such as the Brahimi Report, human security and “Responsibility to Protect”. Thus 
China’s flexible policy on UN peacekeeping stems partly from China’s economic interests in the 
world, including Africa. However, this flexibility stems mainly from a good balance of domestic 
and international perspectives by China regarding international peacekeeping. This balance has 
been required by great powers such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
　　Meanwhile, several issues can be identified by the current trend of international peacekeeping 
itself. While the number of international peacekeeping operations has increased, one can identify 
the overstretch of peacekeeping operations beyond its capacity. This is mainly due to an excessive 
adoption of international and liberalists viewpoints. International peacekeeping has suffered from a 
lack of a geographical balance of operational sites and of the origin of UN military staff, which is 
mainly due to an excessive to domestic and realists perspectives. Furthermore, the advent of strong 
non-UN peace operations will lead to the regionalization of peacekeeping. In this sense, it is highly 
recommended that China shows a strong commitment to UN operations in Asia as positive and con-
sistent peacekeepers.
―　52　―
The History and Potential of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
―　53　―
Notes：
 1  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/bnote.htm. accessed on 8 August 2009
 2  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Contributors,  New York, Feb-
ruary 2005, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors
 3  James A. “Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping, the Dispatching End, the Receiving End”, paper 
written for the National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo and the Jaffee Centre for Strategic 
Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1996, p. 1   
 4  Kegley C. W. and Wittkopf E. R., World Politics: Trend and Transformation (New York: St Mar-
tin’s Press, 2001), p. 29
 5  Anderson A. “Democracy and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996”, International Peace-
keeping,  Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 1
 6  Wainhouse D. W. International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973), p. 562
 7  Boutros-Ghali B. “UN Peacekeeping: An Introduction”, Brown Journal of World Affairs,  Vol. 3, 
No. 1 1996, pp. 17-21  
 8  Lerche Jr. C. O. and Said A. A. Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective,  3rd edi-
tion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 28
 9  James A. Peacekeeping in International Politics(London: Macmillan 1990), p. 12
 10  Bobrow D. B. and Boyer M. A., “Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping 
Operations”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 6, December 1997, pp. 723-729
 11  US State Department, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Op-
erations”, 16 May 1994, p. 801.  The summary of the key elements of the directive states:
   In proving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for 
achieving US objectives.  If US participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic 
military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, we would place our 
national interest uppermost.    
 12  In June 2009, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are ranked the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd , respectively, in the 
ranking of military and police contribution to UN operations, with the number of personnel dis-
patched being 10,603, 9,982, and 8,607, respectively. United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly 
Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Personnel, Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. accessed on 26 July 2009  
 13  Ishizuka K. “Peacekeeping and National Interests: Positive Factors Influencing Potential Contrib-
uting States”, Kyoei University Journal, Vol. 1, 2002, pp. 27-28
 14  Burns E. L. M. “The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping”, International Jour-
nal, Vol. 23, Part 1, 1967, p. 12
 15  Cox A. M. Prospect for Peacekeeping (Washington D. C.: The Brooking Institution, 1967), pp. 
27-32
 16  He Y. “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”, Asian Paper, Institute for Se-
curity and Development Policy, Sweden, July 2007, pp. 17-18 
 17  Liping X. “China: A Responsible Great Power”, Journal of Contemporary China,  Vol. 10, No. 
26, 2001, p. 18 Quoted from He Y. “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 
p. 22
 18  International Crisis Group “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, Asia Report No. 166, 17 
April 2007, p. 5
 19  He Y. p. 21
 20  The United Nations, Statistics on United Nations Activities Related to Peace and Security, 1988 to 
1994 (New York: the United Nations, 1995)
 21  Blodgett J. Q. “The Future of UN Peacekeeping”, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1991, p. 212
共栄大学研究論集　第 8号
―　54　― ―　55　―
 22  Goulding M. “The Evolution of United Nations Peace-Keeping”, Cyril Foster Lecture 1993, the 
Examination School, Oxford University, 4 March 1993 
 23  See International Crisis Group “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, p. 5, and He Y. 
“China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”, p. 24 
 24  According to the Blue Helmet 1996, the total number of contributions by states to UN operations 
between 1948 and 1996 is 905. Therefore, the average number of peacekeeping operations per 
contributing states per contributing state was 8.1 operations. While there are some criteria for se-
lecting “positive contributing states” to UN peacekeeping operations, if one now focuses on the 
frequency of dispatch of the states to UN operations, one can assume that the states which con-
tributed to at least 16 UN operations, double the average, can be called “a positive contributing 
state” to UN peacekeeping operations.
 25  Both the US and the UK joined 13 operations according to the Blue Helmet 1996.
 26  Zhongying P. “China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 
12, No. 1, Spring 2005, p. 76
 27  Ibid. p. 74
 28  UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809 Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 21 
August 2000, para. 49
 29  The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, World Health Organization, 15 September 2005, 
para. 139
 30  Teitt S. “China and the Responsibility to Protect”, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect, 19 December 2008, pp. 6-18
 31  Gill B. and Huang C. “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: its Significance and the Policy Im-
plications”, SIPRI Policy Brief, February 2009, p. 6
 32  Ibid. p. 3
 33  Ling B. “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, International Relations and Institutions 47, China 
Rights Forum, No. 1, 2007
 34  Rios X. “China and the United Nations peace missions”, FRIDE (Fundacion para las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior), Comment, October 2008, p. 2  
 35  He Y. p. 43
 36  International Crisis Group “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, p. i
 37  Ling B. “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, International Relations and Institutions 47, China 
Rights Forum, No. 1, 2007
 38  UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping, 17 June 1992
 39  Center on International Cooperation at New York University, Annual Review of Global Peace Op-
erations 2007: Briefing Paper, New York University. p. 2
 40  Ibid. p. 5
 41  Center on International Cooperation at New York University, Annual Review of Global Peace Op-
erations 2009:Excerpted Form, New York University, p. 3
 42 DDR stands for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.
 43 UN Document A/59/565, 2 December 2004 
―　54　―
The History and Potential of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
―　55　―
Abbreviations:
AU: African Union
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EU: European Union
ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IMF: International Monetary Fund
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUC: United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador 
PDD-25: Presidential Decision Directive 25
PKO: peacekeeping operations
PLA: People’s Liberation Army
R2P: Responsibility to Protect 
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN: United Nations
UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEFI: United Nations Emergency Force I
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIPOM: United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission 
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN: United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire
UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOTIL: United Nations Office in East Timor
UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force 
UNSAS: United Nations Standby Arrangement System
UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET: United Nations Administration in East Timor
UNTAG: United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
WWⅡ : World War Ⅱ   
